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[Security] Bump golang.org/x/crypto from 0.16.0 to 0.17.0

Imanuel Ulbricht requested to merge dependabot-go_modules-golang.org-x-crypto-0.17.0 into main

Bumps golang.org/x/crypto from 0.16.0 to 0.17.0. This update includes a security fix.

Vulnerabilities fixed

Russh vulnerable to Prefix Truncation Attack against ChaCha20-Poly1305 and Encrypt-then-MAC

Summary

Russh v0.40.1 and earlier is vulnerable to a novel prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack), which allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to strip an arbitrary number of messages right after the initial key exchange, breaking SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) in the process and thus downgrading connection security.

Mitigations

To mitigate this protocol vulnerability, OpenSSH suggested a so-called "strict kex" which alters the SSH handshake to ensure a Man-in-the-Middle attacker cannot introduce unauthenticated messages as well as convey sequence number manipulation across handshakes. Support for strict key exchange has been added to Russh in the patched version.

Warning: To take effect, both the client and server must support this countermeasure.

As a stop-gap measure, peers may also (temporarily) disable the affected algorithms and use unaffected alternatives like AES-GCM instead until patches are available.

Details

The SSH specifications of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com MACs) are vulnerable against an arbitrary prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack). This allows for an extension negotiation downgrade by stripping the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO sent after the first message after SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, downgrading security, and disabling attack countermeasures in some versions of OpenSSH. When targeting Encrypt-then-MAC, this attack requires the use of a CBC cipher to be practically exploitable due to the internal workings of the cipher mode. Additionally, this novel attack technique can be used to exploit previously unexploitable implementation flaws in a Man-in-the-Middle scenario.

The attack works by an attacker injecting an arbitrary number of SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages during the initial key exchange and consequently removing the same number of messages just after the initial key exchange has concluded. This is possible due to missing authentication of the excess SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages and the fact that the implicit sequence numbers used within the SSH protocol are only checked after the initial key exchange.

In the case of ChaCha20-Poly1305, the attack is guaranteed to work on every connection as this cipher does not maintain an internal state other than the message's sequence number. In the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, practical exploitation requires the use of a CBC cipher; while theoretical integrity is broken for all ciphers when using this mode, message processing will fail at the application layer for CTR and stream ciphers.

... (truncated)

Patched versions: 0.17.0 Affected versions: < 0.17.0

Commits
  • 9d2ee97 ssh: implement strict KEX protocol changes
  • 4e5a261 ssh: close net.Conn on all NewServerConn errors
  • 152cdb1 x509roots/fallback: update bundle
  • fdfe1f8 ssh: defer channel window adjustment
  • b8ffc16 blake2b: drop Go 1.6, Go 1.8 compatibility
  • 7e6fbd8 ssh: wrap errors from client handshake
  • bda2f3f argon2: avoid clobbering BP
  • See full diff in compare view

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